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THE IMPACT OF ARTICLE 36 VIOLATIONS ON MEXICANS IN 
CAPITAL CASES 
GREGORY J. KUYKENDALL* AND AMY P. KNIGHT** 
Mexico offers extensive expert assistance to Mexican nationals facing death 
sentences throughout the United States. American lawyers with the Mexican 
Capital Legal Assistance Program (hereinafter “MCLAP”) provide wide-
ranging support at all stages of these cases, including multi-dimensional 
litigation efforts, mitigation investigations in Mexico, identification of 
appropriate, culturally knowledgeable experts, preparation of trial, appellate and 
international briefs, and coordination of the litigation of issues especially 
important in cases of Mexican nationals, including language issues, racial 
discrimination, and international law.1 MCLAP is extraordinarily successful at 
both avoiding death sentences being imposed and preventing the carrying out of 
executions.2 
 
* Gregory J. Kuykendall has worked with MCLAP since 2000, then became its director in 
2006, a post he continues to hold. His private practice is based in Tucson, AZ, and he employs 
five full-time attorneys who work primarily on MCLAP cases, in addition to contracting with 
twenty-five other MCLAP lawyers around the country. He is licensed in Arizona, Colorado, 
and Texas, speaks Spanish fluently, and works with members of the Foreign Ministry, 
MCLAP, and appointed lawyers and capital defendants around the country. 
** Amy P. Knight is an attorney at Kuykendall & Associates. She is a graduate of Stanford 
Law School and a former law clerk to the Hon. Lucy H. Koh of the Northern District of 
California. She litigates before the Arizona and United States Supreme Courts and handles 
felony appeals and civil rights cases, as well as doing pretrial and post-conviction work for 
MCLAP. 
The authors wish to thank Mark Warren, a writer and researcher working with MCLAP, for 
extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. See Marquez-Burrola v. State, 157 P.3d 749, 764, n.13 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (“The 
[MCLAP] was established to provide experienced legal, forensic, and financial support to defense 
counsel around the country who represent Mexican nationals charged with capital crimes.”). For 
more on the services MCLAP provides, see Maurice Chammah, How Mexico Saves Its Citizens 
from the Death Penalty in the U.S., MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.themarshall 
project.org/2016/09/22/how-mexico-saves-its-citizens-from-the-death-penalty-in-the-u-s 
[https://perma.cc/6VRD-W4JE]. 
 2. According to internal calculations, the death-sentencing rate for Mexican nationals in 
cases where MCLAP was allowed to provide timely assistance, from March 2008 through 
November 2017, is just 0.58% (4 death sentences out of 694 cases); when MCLAP is prevented 
from assisting, the death-sentencing rate is 100%. [Data on file with the authors]. 
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Of course, Mexico cannot help its nationals if it is unaware they have been 
arrested or are facing capital charges. The law unequivocally requires arresting 
authorities to tell arrested foreign nationals without delay that they have a right 
to have their consulate notified of their arrest—and just as unequivocally 
requires the authorities to then notify the consulate if requested, also without 
delay. The harm flowing from failing to comply with consular notification 
requirements is clearly greatest in a capital case, where a governmental authority 
proposes to take the life of a foreign citizen and the failure to notify his consulate 
results in lost opportunities. And no one stands to benefit more from the proper 
exercise of consular notification than Mexican nationals, both because they are 
uniquely vulnerable to being discriminated against in every stage of capital 
prosecutions and because the assistance offered them by Mexico is especially 
far-reaching. However, U.S. authorities routinely violate these notification laws, 
with predictably disastrous results. 
In this article, we explore the vital importance of U.S. authorities complying 
with their consular notification obligations by demonstrating the glaring 
difference in capital case outcomes where Mexicans do receive consular 
assistance versus where they do not receive such assistance. 
I.  BACKGROUND ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS 
AND ARTICLE 36 
A. Overview of the Vienna Convention 
The United Nations adopted the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
(VCCR) in 1963. As of November 28, 2017, 179 countries have signed on to the 
VCCR,3 making it among the most widely ratified treaties in the world. The 
treaty provides the fundamental framework for consular relations between 
nations, including defining the functions of a consul,4 dictating rules for recall 
of consular personnel,5 protecting consular premises,6 and protecting 
confidential communications between consul and home country.7 One key 
provision, Article 36(1)(b), requires: 
[I]f he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without 
delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular 
district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody 
pending trial or is detained in any other manner. . . . The said authorities shall 
 
 3. United Nations Treaty Collection, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, https://trea 
ties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=III-6&chapter=3&lang=en [https://per 
ma.cc/6YMT-M4LM]. 
 4. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 5, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR]. 
 5. VCCR, supra note 4, art. 23. 
 6. VCCR, supra note 4, art. 31. 
 7. VCCR, supra note 4, art. 35. 
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inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this 
subparagraph.8 
Simply put, police must inform a foreign national of his right to contact his 
consulate for assistance, and also inform the arrestee’s consulate of the arrest if 
the arrestee asks them to. Both requirements must be met without delay. Article 
36 also gives consular officers a right to visit, converse, and correspond with 
their detained nationals, and to arrange for their legal representation.9 It further 
requires that domestic laws and regulations give “full effect” to these rights.10 
The treaty also includes a mechanism for signatory nations to resolve 
disputes between themselves, known as the Optional Protocol concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.11 The Optional Protocol creates 
compulsory jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the treaty in the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).12 The United States signed and ratified 
this optional protocol; however, in 2015, the United States notified the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations that it was withdrawing from that 
Optional Protocol, though not withdrawing from the VCCR.13 
B. A Brief History of Noncompliance/Enforcement Issues 
Arresting agencies throughout the United States have historically abysmally 
failed to notify foreign detainees of their right to consular notification.14 On 
several occasions prior to the United States’ withdrawal from the Optional 
Protocol, countries have taken their complaints about the repeated failures to the 
ICJ. For instance, in 1998, Paraguay instituted proceedings against the United 
States in the ICJ, complaining of a violation of Article 36 by authorities in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, who detained—and ultimately sentenced to death—
 
 8. VCCR, supra note 4, art. 36(1)(b). 
 9. VCCR, supra note 4, art. 36(1)(c). 
 10. VCCR, supra note 4, art. 36(2). 
 11. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. I, Apr. 24, 
1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Letter from Condeleeza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, to Kofi Annan, Secretary-General 
of the United Nations (Mar. 7, 2005), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87288.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6N87-3D3P]. 
 14. See, e.g., Medellín v. Dretke (Medellín I), 544 U.S. 660, 674 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he individual States’ (often confessed) noncompliance with the treaty has been a 
vexing problem.”); see also Mark Warren, Consular Rights, Foreign Nationals and the Death 
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/foreign-nationals-and-death-
penalty-us (“Official records produced by the plaintiff revealed that over 53,000 foreign nationals 
were arrested in New York City during 1997, but that the NYPD Alien Notification Log registered 
only 4 cases in which consulates were notified of those arrests—a failure rate well in excess of 99 
per cent (even presuming that a majority of the detainees might have declined consular 
notification).”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
808 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:805 
Paraguayan national Angel Breard.15 The ICJ, at Paraguay’s request, issued 
provisional measures—similar to a restraining order—to prevent Breard’s 
execution pending decision by the Court.16 Virginia executed Mr. Breard 
anyway, and Paraguay ultimately withdrew its case.17  
Similarly, in 1999, Germany obtained provisional measures from the ICJ to 
prevent Arizona’s planned executions of German brothers Karl and Walter 
LaGrand on the basis of a violation of their Article 36 rights.18 Arizona executed 
both LaGrands in spite of the ICJ’s order. Germany, unlike Paraguay, continued 
its case in the ICJ, ultimately obtaining a groundbreaking decision in Germany’s 
favor.19 That decision held that the VCCR grants rights to individuals, and also 
that domestic laws cannot limit the VCCR rights of foreign nationals.20 The 
decision also made explicit that the ICJ’s provisional measures create legally 
binding judicial orders.21 
1. The Avena Judgment 
Against this backdrop, Mexico, in 2003, brought a case against the United 
States with respect to fifty-two death-sentenced Mexican nationals. Like 
Germany, Mexico prevailed; the ICJ found Article 36 violations in fifty-one of 
the fifty-two cases presented.22 The ICJ held the “without delay” provision of 
Article 36 to require authorities to notify foreign nationals of their right to 
contact the consulate either as soon as they know he is a foreign national or as 
soon as grounds exist for believing he is probably a foreign national.23 The ICJ 
found that in all but one of the fifty-two cases, the United States unambiguously 
violated this obligation.24 Significantly and quite distinctly from the ICJ’s 
holdings in the Paraguay and Germany cases, the Court ordered the United 
States to provide judicial review to each and every one of the fifty-one Mexicans 
named in the suit whose Article 36 rights had been violated, and to determine 
whether the failure to timely advise the consulate of their arrests resulted in 
 
 15. Application of the Republic of Paraguay (Para. v. U.S.), Application, ¶ 5, 7, 11 (Apr. 3, 
1998), http://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/99 [https://perma.cc/33GN-HUJ4]. 
 16. Cases Concerning Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Provisional 
Measures, 1998 ICJ, 248, 258 (Apr. 9 1998). 
 17. The Agent of Paraguay to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice (Para. v. U.S.), 
Correspondence (Apr. 28, 1998), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/99/13120.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/9EB6-B9U9]. 
 18. Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Order, 1999 
I.C.J. Rep. 9 (Mar. 3). 
 19. LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466, ¶ 3, 4, 5 (June 27). 
 20. Id. ¶ 75, 79. 
 21. Id. ¶ 102. 
 22. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶ 90 
(Mar. 31). 
 23. Id. ¶ 63. 
 24. Id. ¶ 106. 
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“actual prejudice to the defendant.”25 Importantly, the United States judiciary 
also had to review and reconsider the convictions and sentences as if procedural 
default rules did not exist.26  
2. Sanchez-Llamas and Medellín 
Following Avena, the procedurally advanced case of José Ernesto Medellín 
Rojas, one of the fifty-one nationals in whose case the ICJ found a violation,27  
became the test case for how the United States judiciary would implement the 
ICJ’s orders. Mr. Medellín unsuccessfully sought to enforce the ICJ ruling that 
mandated review and reconsideration in United States federal court; the Fifth 
Circuit denied relief,28 and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.29 
Before the Supreme Court could consider the case, then-president George W. 
Bush issued an executive memorandum to his Attorney General, asserting 
federal constitutional authority to order states to review the convictions and 
sentences of foreign nationals whose Article 36 rights had been violated.30 
Medellín filed a new claim in state court on the basis of President Bush’s 
memorandum, and the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed his existing case.31 The 
 
 25. Id. ¶ 121. 
 26. Id. ¶ 153(11). 
 27. The especially gruesome facts of Mr. Medellín’s case provided Texas with ample 
opportunity to focus media and political attention away from the true issue: Texas’ refusal to 
comply with a binding international obligation to provide review and reconsideration of Mr. 
Medellín’s conviction and death sentence in light of the Article 36 violation, and the plethora of 
negative consequences to U.S. international relations and commitments flowing from that refusal. 
Mexican Government’s Position on Texas Execution of Mexican Jose Ernesto Medellin Rojas, 
BANDERAS NEWS (Aug. 2008), http://www.banderasnews.com/0808/edat-govtposition.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6BUJ-Y43S]. 
 28. Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 281 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 29. Medellín v. Dretke (Medellín I), 544 U.S. 660, 661 (2005) (per curiam). 
 30. Medellín v. Texas (Medellín II), 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008); see also OFFICE OF THE PRESS 
SEC’Y, Press Release: Memorandum to the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html [https://perma.cc/4KA5-Z8 
J8]. 
 31. Medellín I, 544 U.S. at 667. It is no coincidence that President Bush issued his carefully 
worded executive memorandum, an action which predictably detoured and delayed the progress of 
the Medellín case, while Justice Sandra Day O’Connor still sat on the US Supreme Court. The Bush 
Administration considered Justice O’Connor a probable vote for upholding the Supremacy Clause 
and the ICJ’s ruling in Avena. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 13, 18 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. 
Fox eds., 1996) (“Just as state courts are expected to follow the dictates of the Constitution and 
federal statutes, I think domestic courts should faithfully recognize the obligations imposed by 
international law. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution gives legal force to 
treaties, and our status as a free nation demands faithful compliance with the law of free nations.”). 
Derailing Medellín’s first attempt to enforce the Avena judgment until Justice O’Connor retired 
and President Bush had a chance to appoint her replacement made political sense for an 
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state court dismissed Medellín’s second appeal,32 and again, the U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.33  
While Medellín’s case worked its way toward the Supreme Court, the Court 
decided Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.34 In Sanchez-Llamas, the Court 
consolidated two non-capital defendants’ cases: a Mexican who was not one of 
the Avena litigants and a Honduran national appealed their convictions on the 
basis of Vienna Convention violations. The Court held that statements taken in 
violation of Article 36 would not automatically fall within the “exclusionary 
rule,” and that VCCR claims “may be subjected to the same procedural default 
rules that apply generally to other federal-law claims.”35 This holding regarding 
procedural default was contrary to the Avena judgment’s order that review and 
reconsideration must be undertaken irrespective of procedural default rules.36 
On March 28, 2008, the Court issued its opinion in Medellín v. Texas,37 
ruling that although the ICJ’s Avena judgment created a binding legal obligation, 
states could legally continue to refuse to consider procedurally defaulted Vienna 
Convention claims.38 The Court held that the ICJ’s order that the United States 
provide review and reconsideration for the fifty-one condemned Mexican 
nationals was unenforceable absent congressionally promulgated law, and the 
President’s executive memorandum could not substitute for legislation.39 
3. Failed Attempts at Legislation 
Given Medellín’s holding that, absent federal legislation, the Avena 
judgment cannot be directly enforced as a federal law preempting state laws’ 
limiting the filing of successive habeas petitions, Congress has several times 
considered so-called Avena-implementing legislation.40 A diverse range of 
 
administration giving lip service to its international obligations while at the same time playing to 
its isolationist base. 
 32. Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).  
 33. Medellín I, 544 U.S. at 661. By this time, Justice O’Connor had retired to care for her 
husband who was in declining health, as she had made clear was her intention for quite a long time, 
and Samuel Alito, a stalwart isolationist, had taken her seat on the Court, creating a very different 
legal landscape for the landmark interpretation of the ICJ’s ruling. See Alito Sworn in as Supreme 
Court Justice, NBC NEWS (Jan. 31 2006, 7:48 a.m.), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11111624/ns/us_ 
news-the_changing_court/t/alito-sworn-supreme-court-justice/#.WlpPI62ZPVq [https://perma.cc/ 
AGG3-J2QX]. 
 34. 548 U.S. 331 (2006). 
 35. Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d at 331. 
 36. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶ 121, 
134, 143 (Mar. 31). 
 37. 552 U.S. 491, 491 (2008). 
 38. Id. at 491–92, 506. 
 39. Id. at 532. 
 40. See Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong. (2008); see also 
Senator Patrick Leahy, Press Release: Leahy Renews Effort to Bring U.S. into Compliance with 
International Consular Notification Treaty (June 14, 2011), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/ 
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business, military, diplomatic, religious, and other American interests that all 
recognize the critical importance of treaty compliance in general, and of Article 
36 compliance specifically, have promoted federal implementation of the Avena 
judgment.41 In 2008, Rep. Howard Berman of California introduced the Avena 
Case Implementation Act of 2008, “To create a civil action to provide judicial 
remedies to carry out certain treaty obligations of the United States under the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Optional Protocol to the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.”42 It did not pass. In 2011, Senator 
Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced a similar bill in the Senate;43 it, too, failed. 
There have been attempts to attach language on this issue to other bills, but those 
attempts have yet to succeed.  
Thus, as of now, states remain able to disregard Vienna Convention claims 
not raised at trial, and even to execute Avena litigants who never received the 
ICJ-mandated review and reconsideration of their claims, despite the fact that 
doing so violates binding international legal obligations.44 Indeed, Texas has 
since executed five men whom the ICJ ordered to receive review and 
reconsideration: José Ernesto Medellín Rojas, on August 5, 2008;45 Humberto 
Leal Garcia, on July 7, 2011;46 Edgar Arias Tamayo, on January 22, 2014;47 
Ramiro Hernandez Llanas, on April 9, 2014;48 and Ruben Cardenas Ramirez, 




 41. See, e.g., Euna Lee, Consular access: A two-way street on a crucial right, THE WASH. 
POST (June 21, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/consular-access-a-two-way-
street-on-a-crucial-right/2011/06/22/AGYkPdjH_print.html [https://perma.cc/T6JF-HT6T]. 
 42. Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 43. Leahy, supra note 40. 
 44. Although states are not compelled by either federal judicial rulings or federal legislation 
to implement the Avena judgment or enforce Article 36, they remain free to recognize the 
importance of compliance with international law to their constituents, and can both implement the 
Avena judgment and create Article 36 compliance mechanisms through their own judicial and 
legislative actions. See infra Part III. 
 45. BANDERAS NEWS, supra note 27. 
 46. Chris McGreal, Humberto Leal Garcia Executed in Texas Despite White House Appeal, 
GUARDIAN (July 7 2011, 7:56 p.m.), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/08/humberto-
leal-garcia-executed-texas [https://perma.cc/4KMU-F5X5]. 
 47. Tom Dart, Mexican Edgar Tamayo Executed in Texas Despite Last-Minute Pleas, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 22 2014, 11:00 p.m.), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/23/mexican-
edgar-tamayo-executed-texas [https://perma.cc/5VL3-LFVN]. 
 48. Texas Executes Mexican National for 1997 Murder, CBS NEWS (Apr. 10, 2014, 10:55 
a.m.), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/texas-executes-mexican-national-for-1997-murder/ 
[https://perma.cc/NVS2-5DKE]. 
 49. Texas Execution of Ruben Cardenas Ramirez Sparks Row with Mexico, BBC NEWS (Nov. 
9, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41928904 [https://perma.cc/5UD3-ERYY]. 
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II.  HOW ARTICLE 36 VIOLATIONS HARM MEXICAN CAPITAL DEFENDANTS 
This background establishes not only that the United States has continually 
failed to comply with its binding treaty obligations under Article 36, but that 
Mexico and other countries care enough about these violations to continue to 
fiercely litigate the issue, both domestically and internationally. But why do both 
Mexico and the international community at large consider strict Article 36 
compliance to be such a big deal? This section explores how Article 36 
violations dramatically impact Mexican nationals facing capital charges50 and 
demonstrates the life and death difference in case outcomes when Mexican 
consular authorities timely learn of their nationals’ arrests.  
Although the United States is obliged to comply with Article 36 in relation 
to the citizens of any of the 178 other countries who have signed the VCCR, the 
compliance concern is especially great for citizens of Mexico. This is of course 
partly due to the sheer number of Mexican citizens in the United States. In 2010, 
fully twenty-nine percent of the foreign-born population residing in the United 
States was from Mexico,51 and this does not include large numbers here 
temporarily or otherwise not recorded by the census. The next closest country, 
China, had just five percent.52 But as detailed below, apart from numbers, 
Mexicans are uniquely vulnerable at every stage of the capital prosecution 
process due to rampant racial and ethnic bias, significant differences between 
the Mexican and American legal systems, and complex language issues. 
A. Mexicans are Subject to Extreme Racial and Ethnic Bias 
Mexican immigrants “come to the United States to face grossly incorrect 
perceptions, negative stereotypes, both malignant and benign prejudices, 
hostility, and antipathy.”53 Prejudice specifically against Mexicans has recently 
been prevalent in the media, in part due to a series of anti-Mexican comments 
 
 50. Article 36 applies any time a foreign national is arrested or detained; it is not limited to 
capital, or even serious, crimes. Yet the three ICJ cases on Article 36 were all death penalty cases. 
One reason for this is simply that the stakes are higher; countries—especially those without the 
death penalty—are more concerned about their citizens being put to death than they are about them 
serving prison terms. Mexico is particularly opposed to capital punishment, and feels a special duty 
to protect its citizens from this practice; it is thus especially aggrieved when the United States 
prevents it from doing so. Moreover, death penalty cases are more complex than other prosecutions, 
and accordingly provide more opportunities for consular intervention and assistance. Indeed, the 
presentation of mitigation evidence, a central feature of capital cases, is an especially fruitful area 
for consular assistance. See infra Section II.D. Thus, it is in capital cases that consular notification 
is the most crucial. 
 51. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 6 
(2010), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/pdf/cspan_fb_slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG4C-7K 
JA] (referencing data from the American Community Survey and the Census of Population). 
 52. Id. at 9. 
 53. JUAN-VINCENTE PALERM, BOBBY R. VINCENT & KATHRYN VINCENT, Mexican 
Immigrants in Courts, in IMMIGRANTS IN COURTS 96 (Joanne Moore ed., 1999). 
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made by now-President Donald Trump.54 It is not simply race or foreignness, 
but specifically Mexican nationality targeted by this focused vitriol. Such unfair 
biases can easily affect discretionary prosecutorial decisions, as well as judges’ 
rulings and juries’ willingness to convict and to impose death sentences.55 
The well-documented phenomena of prejudice and bias exist throughout the 
justice system,56 but they are especially problematic in capital cases because of 
the unparalleled opportunities for multiple decision makers to unfairly exercise 
unreviewable or virtually unreviewable discretion. Many states have ever-
expanding lists of aggravating circumstances that cover nearly every first-degree 
murder conceivable.57 Those officials who make the decision about how to 
charge a case thus exercise significant discretion in choosing which cases will 
be prosecuted capitally.58 This discretion leaves room for police and prosecutors, 
consciously or not, to give effect to any biases they or their constituents may 
harbor, and to seek the death penalty in a discriminatory manner. 
 
 54. See, e.g., Transcript of Donald J. Trump Presidential Announcement Speech, TIME (June 
16, 2015), http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/ [https://perma.cc/U9EP-
X3UZ] (“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. . . . They’re sending people 
that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. 
They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.”). 
 55. See generally CULTURAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE (Linda Friedman Ramirez ed., 3d 
ed. 2007) (discussing selective prosecution, immigration racial profiling, and cultural issues with 
jury selection and sentencing); see also Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017) 
(showing general prejudice toward Mexican Americans in non-capital case where juror expressed 
view that defendant was guilty of sexual assault because he was Mexican). 
 56. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (“Throughout our history 
differences in race and color have defined easily identifiable groups which have at times required 
the aid of the courts in securing equal treatment under the laws.”); NANCY E. WALKER ET AL., 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, LOST OPPORTUNITIES: THE REALITY OF LATINOS IN THE U.S. 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2004) (“[R]esearch and information to date show that, along with 
other persons of color, Latinos receive more severe treatment at all stages of the criminal justice 
system, beginning with police stops and ending with longer periods of incarceration, than similarly-
situated White Americans.”); Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith & Danielle M. Young, Devaluing 
Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty 
States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 558 (2014) (finding that death-qualified jurors held both greater 
implicit and greater explicit racial bias than non-death-qualified jurors). 
 57. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, 12, Hidalgo v. Arizona, U.S. No. 17-251 
(Aug. 14, 2017) (noting that virtually every first-degree murder in Arizona fits under at least one 
of the state’s aggravating circumstances); Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in State Death Penalty 
Systems: The Missouri Death Penalty Assessment Report, ABA, at v (Mar. 2012), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/death_penalty_moratorium/final_ 
missouri_assessment_report.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/3L5H-HKTK] (“Missouri should 
substantially revise its aggravating circumstances, such that only a ‘narrow category of the most 
serious’ murder cases are eligible for the death penalty, as required by the U.S. Supreme Court.”). 
 58. Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in the Charging 
Function, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1259, 1260 (2011). 
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This concern is not hypothetical, nor is it merely a question of political 
correctness; initial charging decisions seriously impact just outcomes. For 
example, in its submission to the ICJ in the Avena litigation, Mexico highlighted 
the illustrative case of Jose Trinidad Loza, one of the Avena litigants whose 
Article 36 rights were violated: “The lead police detective in Mr. Loza’s case 
has admitted that he referred to Mr. Loza as a ‘wetback’—an exceedingly 
derogatory ethnic slur used to describe recent Mexican immigrants—throughout 
his investigation. This same officer made the decision to seek the death penalty 
against Mr. Loza.”59  
Capital cases afford multiple junctures where law enforcement personnel 
and prosecutors can purposefully or unconsciously discriminate, starting with 
initial investigation and arrest, through the decision to bring murder charges, the 
decision to file a death notice, the decision to take a case to trial rather than offer 
a plea bargain, and the conduct of the trial itself. Although discriminatory intent 
by police and prosecutors is exceedingly difficult to prove—any evidence 
usually remains in the hands of prosecutors and the standards even for obtaining 
discovery, let alone obtaining relief, are almost insurmountably high60—strong 
circumstantial evidence exists that police and prosecutors use their broad 
discretion in discriminatory ways at every single stage of a criminal 
proceeding.61 Indeed, in some instances, courts have explicitly recognized that 
law enforcement agencies have discriminatorily stopped, detained, and arrested 
 
 59. Memorial of Mexico, Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. 
U.S.), ¶ 43 (June 20, 2003), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/128/8272.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/5QWN-DQHE] [hereinafter Memorial of Mexico]. 
 60. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996) (requiring, in a racial selective 
prosecution claim, a showing that the government declined to prosecute similarly situated suspects 
of other races in order to receive entitlement to discovery); United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 
863 (2002) (applying the same standard to capital cases); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 
608 (1984) (“It is appropriate to judge selective prosecution claims according to ordinary equal 
protection standards. Under our prior cases, these standards require petitioner to show both that the 
passive enforcement system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose.”) (citations omitted). 
 61. See, e.g., Ernie Thomson, Discrimination and the Death Penalty in Arizona, 22 CRIM. 
JUST. REV. 65, 73 (1997) (noting that a Hispanic man accused of killing a White man is 4.6 times 
as likely to be sentenced to death than a White man accused of killing a Hispanic man); see also 
Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 HOUS. L. REV., 807, 834 
(2008) (finding in Harris County, Texas, “the bar appears to have been set lower for pursuing death 
against black defendants.”); Daniel Lathrop & Anna Flagg, Killings of Black Men by Whites are 
Far More Likely to be Ruled “Justifiable,” THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 14, 2017 5:30 a.m.), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/08/14/killings-of-black-men-by-whites-are-far-more-
likely-to-be-ruled-justifiable?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter&utm_source=open 
ing-statement&utm_term=newsletter-20171128-899 [https://perma.cc/RK3X-SJGS] (reporting 
that police classified white-on-black killings as “justifiable” at a much higher rate than other 
killings). 
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Latinos on the basis of their race.62 And the Supreme Court has recognized that 
where broad discretion exists, “there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice 
to operate.”63 But because of the virtually impossibly high evidentiary standards 
of proof imposed on defendants seeking to establish selective prosecution, 
prosecutors largely maintain the ability to discriminate with impunity,64 and they 
continue to do so.  
When consular officials become aware that Mexican nationals are detained 
and facing serious charges, they can and do intervene and attempt to minimize 
the effects of these biases. As Mexico explained to the ICJ in the Avena 
litigation, “Mexican consular officers are keenly aware of the overt and subtle 
ways in which Mexican nationals can be treated differently, based upon their 
nationality. Through their vigilant presence in courtrooms, jails, and lawyers’ 
offices, they can detect the presence of unfair bias, and take steps to expose it.”65 
The mere presence of officials from Mexico in court may have the effect of 
increasing awareness and reducing the impunity with which racist attitudes 
might be expressed and enacted. But more importantly, consular officials and 
the MCLAP lawyers employed to bring their expertise to the fore charge into 
these cases with a wide array of immediate assistance, ranging from short-term 
advice to the defendant to not discuss the case with anyone besides their lawyers 
to mitigation investigation to intensive strategy assistance.66 
B. Differences between the Mexican and U.S. Justice Systems Render 
Mexicans Uniquely Vulnerable 
Unfamiliarity with the U.S. justice system can be a major problem for any 
foreign national detained in this country. For instance, most Americans are at 
least vaguely familiar with the concept of “the right to remain silent” and the 
rest of the Miranda rights from movies and television, if not from a civics class; 
foreign citizens often are completely unaware of their most basic rights. Beyond 
this baseline risk, however, particular differences between the Mexican and U.S. 
 
 62. See Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1266 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding 
injunction based on law enforcement practices discriminating against Latinos in Maricopa County, 
Arizona); see also Press Release: Department of Justice Files Lawsuit in Arizona Against 
Maricopa County, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and Sheriff Joseph Arpaio, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (May 10, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-files-lawsuit-arizona-
against-maricopa-county-maricopa-county-sheriff-s [https://perma.cc/NEY6-Y84Q]; Troy Carter, 




 63. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986). 
 64. Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of 
Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 618–24 (1998). 
 65. Memorial of Mexico, supra note 59, ¶ 42. 
 66. See infra Section II.B. 
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criminal justice systems render Mexicans particularly vulnerable to making 
unwise decisions after their arrests. 
1. Confessions 
Crucially, until recently,67 the law in Mexico provided that confessions were 
not admissible unless taken in front of the Public Prosecutor or judge and in the 
presence of counsel or a “person of confidence” to the defendant.68 Thus, a 
Mexican unfamiliar with U.S. pretrial rules would understandably believe any 
information he told police would not be used against him and indeed, giving an 
uncounseled statement might actually be useful in avoiding harsh treatment.69 
Mexicans have thus historically been—and many surely remain—uniquely 
likely to give damaging admissions, especially where police use coercive 
interrogation tactics. In addition, because of draconian immigration 
consequences for many arrested Mexican nationals and their families, coercive 
interrogation techniques abound in cases involving Mexican suspects; they are 
more deferential to law enforcement because of fear of deportation, and in some 
cases police may intentionally exploit this vulnerability. A suspect who believes 
he or a loved one will receive harsher treatment if he does not confess, for 
instance, or one who believes he will be allowed to go home or contact family if 
he offers a statement first, is much more likely to do so if he comes from a culture 
where that statement cannot be used against him. 
Consular officials can mitigate this concern; when given access to their 
nationals without delay, they thoroughly explain this particular aspect of the U.S. 
justice system, advise the detainee not to speak to the police without an attorney, 
and put things in familiar terms the detainee can process and understand. Advice 
from a consular official is much more likely to be both understood and trusted 
than, say, a Miranda warning given by police. Moreover, consular officials, 
when given prompt notification and access, advise their nationals before courts 
typically would appoint an attorney;70 appointed attorneys generally do not 
 
 67. In 2008, a set of sweeping reforms to the Mexican criminal justice system was passed, to 
be implemented over the course of eight years. See NANCY G. CORTÉS, OCTAVIO RODRÍGUEZ 
FERREIRA & DAVID A. SHIRK, 2016 JUSTICIABARÓMETRO—PERSPECTIVES ON MEXICO’S 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: WHAT DO ITS OPERATORS THINK? 1, 41 (2016), https://justicein 
mexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2016-Justiciabarometro_English-Version_Online.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XW3D-4APZ]. The last of these reforms were scheduled to take effect in 2016, 
but implementation efforts are still underway. Id. 
 68. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 59, ¶ 59 (quoting Declaration of Adrián Franco, 
annex 3). 
 69. Of course, Miranda warnings include an advisement that statements can be used against a 
defendant, but significant barriers exist to comprehension of Miranda warnings, especially for non-
English-speaking defendants. See infra Part II.C. 
 70. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS 24–25 (2016), https://trav 
el.state.gov/content/dam/travel/CNAtrainingresources/CNA_Manual_4th_Edition_September_20
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U4W-5J8 6]. 
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receive formal appointment during early interrogations unless the detainee 
specifically requests one, something many Mexican nationals do not even realize 
they can request, or may not know how to request.71 Consular officials are thus 
uniquely situated to prevent damaging, often illegal, and sometimes outright 
false, confessions—if they are notified of the detention and given prompt access 
to their nationals, as Article 36 requires.  
2. Plea Bargains 
Prior to recent changes, Mexican law did not allow for negotiated 
resolutions, where reduced penalties are offered in exchange for a guilty plea, in 
most serious felony cases.72 Thus, a prosecutor making such an offer in Mexico 
or a defense attorney proposing such a resolution clearly would have been 
breaking the law. This is in sharp distinction to U.S. practice where the 
overwhelming majority of cases get resolved through plea bargains.73 Because 
of this difference, Mexicans unfamiliar with the U.S. system are likely to be 
highly suspicious of, or even outright refuse to consider, plea negotiations. Yet 
a negotiated plea is very often a defendant’s best chance to avoid a death 
sentence. 
Consular officials can assist in this process by explaining the system, the 
benefits of a plea offer, and the consequences of rejecting it. Consular officials 
and lawyers provided by the Mexican government through MCLAP can work 
with the defendants and with their families to explore plea bargain possibilities 
and convince otherwise recalcitrant defendants that such resolutions are not only 
perfectly legal in the United States, but often advisable. Consular officials can 
also meet with prosecutors and present written submissions seeking withdrawal 
of the death penalty, which can include mitigation evidence gathered by 
Mexican officials in Mexico.74 Indeed, Mexico routinely hires mitigation 
specialists to conduct a preliminary mitigation investigation at the outset of the 
case, specifically to gather basic evidence that can be used in early attempts to 
avert the death penalty.75 This mitigation information can be crucial in securing 
 
 71. Memorial of Mexico, Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. 
U.S.), Annex 3, Declaration of Adrián Franco, ¶ 5 (June 20, 2003) (“This is largely due to a history 
of corruption in the judicial system, and Mexicans’ corresponding lack of faith that lawyers, judges, 
and others in positions of authority will be sensitive to their concerns.”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. LINDSEY DEVERS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE: U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND 
CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH SUMMARY 1 (Jan. 24, 2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/ 
PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) (“[S]cholars estimate that about 
90 to 95 percent of both federal and state court cases are resolved through this process.”). 
 74. Memorial of Mexico, supra note 59, ¶ 63. 
 75. Many jurisdictions continue to reject their own rules and the guidelines of the American 
Bar Association by refusing to appoint a full defense team, including a qualified mitigation 
specialist, until after the prosecution has announced its intention to seek the death penalty. See, e.g., 
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. § 6.8(B)(1)(iii) (“Lead counsel. . . . shall be familiar with and guided by the 
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a plea offer, and might never be discovered or presented without the assistance 
of the Mexican government. 
Hundreds of lives have been saved by plea bargains secured in the cases of 
Mexican nationals who received prompt and ongoing assistance from their 
government. But when the consulate is not aware of a Mexican national’s 
detention and prosecution, its personnel are unable to offer this critical 
assistance.76 
3. Public Defenders 
Until quite recently, Mexico has had a well-known and longstanding history 
of corruption in its judicial system.77 As a consequence and in contrast to much 
of the U.S. citizenry, many Mexicans have a, “lack of faith that lawyers, judges, 
and others in positions of authority will be sensitive to their concerns.”78 This 
mistrust can manifest as an unwillingness to work with public defenders or 
court-appointed lawyers, who are often perceived as part of “the system.”79 
When the defendant does not trust the lawyer, it is almost impossible to conduct 
the deeply personal mitigation investigation that is necessary for the proper 
 
performance standards in the 2003 American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and 
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases . . . .”); see also ABA, Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
913, 921 (2003) (“Thus, it is imperative that counsel begin investigating mitigating evidence and 
assembling the defense team as early as possible—well before the prosecution has actually 
determined that the death penalty will be sought.”) [hereinafter ABA, Guidelines for Defense 
Counsel]. 
 76. If an incompetently-advised defendant rejects a plea offer, relief is generally not available 
unless the defendant can prove, by more than just his say-so, that he would have accepted the offer 
had he been advised accurately, and that the Court would have approved it. See Missouri v. Frye, 
566 U.S. 134, 147 (2012). Thus, timely intervention when the offer is actually on the table is 
essential. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., Hiroshi Fukurai & Richard Krooth, The Establishment of All-Citizen Juries as a 
Key Component of Mexico’s Judicial Reform: Cross-National Analyses of Lay Judge Participation 
and the Search for Mexico’s Judicial Sovereignty, 16 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 39 (2010) 
(introducing proposal “to combat political and institutional corruption within the judicial branch of 
the government”); Benjamin H. Harville, Ensuring Protection or Opening the Floodgates?: 
Refugee Law and Its Application to Those Fleeing Drug Violence in Mexico, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
135, 147 (2012) (“Mexico’s federal judicial system is similarly plagued by corruption and 
ineffectiveness.”); Robert Kossick, The Rule of Law and Development in Mexico, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L 
& COMP. LAW 715, 751 (2004) (“The perceived subordination of the [Mexican Supreme Court] 
relative to the executive branch, coupled with widespread skepticism regarding the politicized 
nature of court appointments and intra-branch corruption, further eroded judicial prestige and 
citizen confidence in Mexico’s legal institutions.”). 
 78. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 59, ¶ 57, annex 3 (quoting Declaration of Adrián 
Franco). 
 79. See PALERM ET AL., supra note 53, at 92 (“If there is a high risk involved in the situation, 
Mexican immigrants may refuse to divulge information to anyone in authority—attorney, judge, or 
counselor.”). 
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preparation of a capital case, including sensitive topics such as history of abuse, 
poverty, family violence, drug and alcohol use, mental illness, and intellectual 
disability.80 Nor can the advice of an untrusted attorney—paid by the same 
governmental entity trying to kill the defendant—generally convince him that it 
may be in his best interests to accept a plea bargain.81  
Consular officials can effectively explain to defendants that appointed 
lawyers really are duty bound to act in their best interests, while also acting as a 
“bridge,” explaining cultural differences to both sides and encouraging 
meaningful communication between appointed lawyers and their Mexican 
clients. This assistance is invaluable in building a working relationship yielding 
successful representation.  
C. Language Issues 
Many Mexican nationals in the United States speak little or no English.82 
Thus, from the moment of their arrest, they are often at a distinct disadvantage 
in their ability to understand what is happening, exercise their rights, and 
communicate with arresting authorities. 
Compounding this phenomenon, the ability to speak “some” English can be 
misconstrued by authorities as evidence of sufficient linguistic ability to 
understand rights and make knowing, intelligent decisions about questions 
phrased in English.83 In addition, police frequently fail to provide neutral, 
qualified Spanish interpreters during interrogations: either speaking to Spanish-
speaking suspects in English, ignoring their language needs,84 or using 
individuals who speak “some” Spanish but are not qualified interpreters, and 
often have poor speaking skills or speak different varieties of Spanish not easily 
understood by Mexican defendants.85 These failures often create serious 
communication difficulties during interrogations, and cause Mexican nationals 
 
 80. ABA, Guidelines for Defense Counsel, supra note 75, at 1005–09. 
 81. Id. at 1009 n.181; see also supra Section II.B.1. 
 82. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 59, ¶ 57. 
 83. Mendoza v. United States, 755 F.3d 821, 830–831 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding no due process 
right to have discovery materials translated into English or to have continual interpretation 
throughout a trial); Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1049–51 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding no 
error when Judge found language difficulties did not constitute a “major” problem); United States 
v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994) (recounting attempt by trial judge to force the Cuban 
defendant to testify in English because he had some English ability). 
 84. Memorial of Mexico, supra note 59, ¶ 57. 
 85. See Memorial of Mexico, Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. 
U.S.), Annex 4, Declaration of Roseann Dueñas González, ¶ 16–18 (June 20, 2003). In addition to 
different varieties of Spanish, there are approximately eighty indigenous languages spoken in 
Mexico. Thus, some defendants may not speak or understand Spanish at all. See Language and 
Cultures of Present-Day Mexico: Traditional Names, SIL MEXICO, http://www.mexico.sil.org/lan 
guage_culture [https://perma.cc/DT7V-WD5F]. 
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to agree to statements they do not fully comprehend.86 They can also lead to 
false confessions; uncomprehending Mexicans frequently nod or say “yes” in 
response to leading questions they do not fully understand, through a well-
documented combination of lack of comprehension and a culturally-based 
tendency to acquiesce to authority figures.87 
Language barriers can also render Miranda warnings ineffectual. For one 
thing, warnings may be given in English; Spanish-dominant defendants simply 
may not fully understand the words being spoken and the rather complex and 
compound alternatives being offered. Even if the warnings are given in 
appropriate Spanish, they are often spoken extremely rapidly, declaratively as 
opposed to interrogatively, and without attention to the detainee’s 
comprehension.88 The warnings also may not be translated appropriately or 
pronounced comprehensibly. The Miranda advisements are linguistically 
complex and typically recited in an illogical order.89 Thus, the chances that a 
non-English-proficient Mexican national, saddled with a cultural bias toward 
pleasing authority and avoiding conflict, will fully comprehend and then invoke 
his rights are infinitesimally small. These linguistic issues are compounded by 
the differences in legal practice in the two countries discussed supra.  
Consular officials can advocate for Mexican nationals by insisting on the 
presence of a qualified, neutral interpreter, and can explain complicated and 
unfamiliar concepts, like the full import of the Miranda warnings or the legal 
consequences (or lack thereof) of insisting on a lawyer’s representation, in the 
appropriate register of the Spanish language. Without consular assistance, non-
English-speaking Mexicans are at a distinct disadvantage. 
D. Other Assistance Mexico Provides 
In addition to combatting racial bias, bridging cultural differences, and 
assisting with language barriers, Mexico provides key assistance to capital 
defendants in two additional areas: enhancing the quality of legal representation, 
and assisting in amassing mitigation evidence.  
1. Quality of Representation 
Although there are of course many skilled and dedicated capital defense 
practitioners working in this country, it remains the case that it is often 
 
 86. Declaration of Roseann Dueñas González, supra note 85, ¶ 23. (“I have observed a 
tendency on the part of Mexican nationals to acquiesce to all demands by authority figures and 
answer all questions put to them even if they do not understand the question. . . most often it is 
because of the cultural conditioning which requires them to speak to authority even if they cannot 
speak the language.”). 
 87. Id. ¶ 35. 
 88. Id. ¶ 25. 
 89. Id. ¶¶ 26, 27. 
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[a]bysmally ineffectual lawyers—chronically under-remunerated; often young 
and inexperienced, patently unqualified and incompetent, unethical, or bar-
disciplined; sometimes drug-impaired, drunken, comatose, psychotic, or senile; 
very often grossly negligent; and nearly always out-gunned—who represent 
capital defendants in most death penalty states around the country.90  
Commentators have repeatedly observed that the “death penalty is not reserved 
for the worst murderers; it is reserved for the murderers with the worst lawyers 
at trial.”91  
Consular officers can monitor defense counsel’s performance and intervene 
if the representation is insufficient. For instance, they can ask courts to appoint 
new, better-qualified counsel; they can recruit pro bono counsel; or they can 
even retain qualified counsel.92 They can also visit the defendant in jail, 
something defense attorneys do not always find sufficient time to frequently 
do.93 In its submission to the ICJ, Mexico identified one case where Mexico sent 
a Spanish-speaking attorney to interview a detained defendant; that attorney 
determined that the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the crime, a fact 
defense counsel had not discovered.94 Mexico then obtained his birth certificate, 
and the defense used it to secure a waiver of the death penalty.95 Without 
Mexico’s involvement, this crucial fact might never have been discovered.  
Even where the attorneys are competent capital practitioners, they normally 
lack experience in representing Mexican nationals. Consular officials can assist 
such attorneys by referring appropriate experts, assisting in the identification of 
international law issues, providing cultural guidance, and assisting with 
mitigation investigation. 
2. Mitigation Investigation 
Mexico often sends a mitigation specialist to conduct a preliminary 
mitigation investigation aimed at heading off a death notice before an appointed 
defense team is even getting off the ground.96 But Mexico also offers significant 
assistance with the primary, ongoing mitigation work. When a defendant was 
born and spent any portion of his life in Mexico, both records and witnesses 
important to the mitigation case likely reside exclusively in Mexico. A U.S. 
 
 90. James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2102–06 
(2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 91. Michael Mello, Certain Blood for Uncertain Reasons: A Love Letter to the Vermont 
Legislature on Not Reinstating Capital Punishment, 32 VT. L. REV. 765, 875–76 (2008). 
 92. Memorial of Mexico, supra note 59, ¶ 4. 
 93. Id. ¶ 75. 
 94. Id. ¶ 77 n.82 (quoting from Declaration of Roberto Rodríguez Hernández). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Supra Part II.B. 
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subpoena will not obtain materials located in Mexico.97 Moreover, record-
keeping practices are starkly different in Mexico than in the United States. 
Unlike in the United States, no standardized practices exist for recordkeeping 
and retention, nor for the privacy of information.98 Thus, investigation practices 
familiar to U.S. capital defense attorneys and mitigation specialists will not 
suffice where the defendant is a Mexican national, and the existence or absence 
of records cannot be inferred by using the same references as in the United 
States. 
Consular officials can assist in gathering evidence in various ways. For 
instance, they can easily obtain critical documents such as birth, death, and 
marriage certificates, basic educational data, and criminal history records. They 
can sometimes contact government-run schools and medical facilities and obtain 
directly any records that may exist. They can also provide letters of introduction 
for mitigation specialists traveling to Mexico, which can be invaluable in 
securing the cooperation of local officials whose assistance is needed to obtain 
relevant documents. 
The Mexican government can also assist defense teams with interviewing 
life history witnesses. In some cases, Mexico is able to refer teams to culturally 
competent mitigation specialists who are thoroughly bilingual and bicultural, 
and can investigate within Mexico in ways that other mitigation specialists 
simply cannot. Mexico can also advise counsel on significant cultural 
differences that routinely impact capital mitigation issues, such as the greater 
stigma attached to mental illness in Mexico than in the United States. They can 
also assist counsel in seeking the funding necessary to conduct a life-history 
investigation in a foreign country.99 Finally, Mexican government offices can 
sometimes provide directions, referrals, and other on-the-ground assistance to 
defense team members traveling to Mexico. It would be nearly impossible for 
even a highly competent defense team to conduct a truly thorough mitigation 
investigation without the assistance of the Mexican government. 
CONCLUSION 
Consular notification is anything but a mere formality; it has life and death 
implications in capital cases, especially for Mexican nationals. As indicated 
supra, where Mexico is notified and permitted to assist, just 0.58% of death-
possible cases end in a death sentence, compared with 100% of the cases where 
 
 97. Federal statute provides for service of a subpoena upon a U.S. citizen or permanent 
resident in a foreign country. 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (2018). These regulations do not include any method 
to subpoena non-U.S. nationals or residents. See 22 C.F.R. § 92.86–92.89 (2018). 
 98. Gregory J. Kuykendall, Alicia Amezcua-Rodriguez & Mark Warren, Mitigation Abroad: 
Preparing a Successful Case for Life for the Foreign National Client, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 989, 
1005–06 (2008). 
 99. Id. at 1004. 
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Mexico is not permitted to assist.100 Thus, Mexico’s involvement quite literally 
means the difference between life and death in most cases. Yet all over the 
United States, authorities continue to flout their straightforward obligations 
under Article 36.101 In light of the Supreme Court’s holding that the Avena 
judgment is not binding on state courts absent congressional implementation, 
and congress’s failure to act, there have been few consequences for this 
continuing breaking of the law, despite the fact that all nine Justices and even 
the Texas Solicitor General acknowledge the judgment creates an international 
law obligation.102 Thus, Congress and the courts have given police little reason 
to comply with their obligations.  
Although the federal government cannot force states, as of now, to comply 
with Avena and hear procedurally defaulted Article 36 claims, some states 
recognize their obligation and have implemented it. Oklahoma voluntarily 
complied with Avena by ordering an evidentiary hearing on whether a defendant 
had been prejudiced by the lack of consular notification, despite the Article 36 
claim being procedurally defaulted.103 Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry then 
immediately commuted the death sentence to life without parole;104 the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently found that he had been 
prejudiced by the Article 36 violation.105 Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on prejudice from an Article 36 violation 
in 2012, again despite the claim not having been raised at trial.106 Like the 
Oklahoma Court, the Nevada trial court found prejudice from the violation; the 
Court then ordered a new penalty hearing.107 Finally, the California Supreme 
Court, although it has not yet remanded a procedurally defaulted claim for a 
hearing on prejudice, has indicated a potential willingness to do so.108 Thus, state 
 
 100. See supra note 2. 
 101. See supra Part II. 
 102. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008) (“No one disputes that the Avena decision—
a decision that flows from the treaties through which the United States submitted to ICJ jurisdiction 
with respect to Vienna Convention disputes—constitutes an international law obligation on the 
part of the United States.”). 
 103. Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 3711623 at *1 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 
2004). 
 104. See John Greiner, Henry Commutes Death Sentence, NEWSOK (May 14, 2004, 12:00 
AM), http://newsok.com/article/1902645 [https://perma.cc/B2SE-5V5Y]. 
 105. Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184, 1188 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (“Torres clearly showed 
that the Mexican government would have expended considerable resources on the capital phase of 
his case. If Torres were still under a capital sentence, this would indeed amount to a showing of 
prejudice.”). 
 106. Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 128 Nev. 900 at *3 (Nev. Sep. 19, 2012). 
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